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I. INTRODUCTION
The scenario is all too familiar to criminal defense counsel. The defendant
is charged with and on trial for crime X. During the trial, the prosecutor offers
evidence of uncharged misconduct, crime Y, which is mentioned nowhere in
the indictment against the defendant. The doctrine governing the admission of
* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, B.A., 1967, J.D.,
1969, University of San Francisco.
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the evidence in this scenario is of critical importance in criminal practice.
Proof of the defendant's other crimes can be so devastating to the defense that
this species of evidence has been called the "prosecutor's delight."1 The availa-
ble empirical research, including studies by the Chicago Jury Project, the
London School of Economics, and the National Science Foundation, confirms
that the introduction of evidence of the defendant's other crimes can dramati-
cally affect the outcome of a prosecution.' The numbers tell the story. In many
jurisdictions, alleged errors in the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence
are the most frequent ground for appeal in criminal cases.3 In some jurisdic-
tions, errors in the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence are the most
common ground for reversal.
4
The federal rule codifying the doctrine, Rule 404(b), has generated more
reported decisions than any other subsection of the Federal Rules.5 This rule
simply states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mis-
take or accident.6
The first sentence of the rule continues the hoary, common law principle
that the prosecutor may not offer evidence of the defendant's uncharged
crimes to prove the defendant's bad "character. . .in order to show that (the
defendant) acted in conformity therewith." The prosecutor may not introduce
the evidence to establish the defendant's bad character and then argue that
the defendant's bad character increases the probability that the defendant
committed the charged crime. The common law and Rule 404(b) thus forbid
the prosecutor from resorting to the theory of logical relevance depicted in
Figure 1.
1. Comment, Exclusion of Prior Acquittals: An Attack on the "Prosecutor's
Delight," 21 UCLA L. REV. 892, 896 (1974).
2. See E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:02 (1984).
3. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5239, at 427 (1978).
4. Casenote, Evidence-The Emotional Propensity Exception, 1978 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 153, 156 n.29.
5. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE % 404[08] (1982).
6. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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Evidence § 2-18, at 2-48
(1984).
The rationale for banning this theory of logical relevance is that the the-
ory poses two significant probative dangers. The first step, inferring the defen-
dant's bad character from the uncharged crime, raises the danger of prejudice
to the defendant. In deciding whether to draw the inference, the jury must
focus on the type of person the defendant is. The jury must ask whether the
defendant is an immoral law-breaker. This focus is dangerous because it
tempts the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. In effect, the jury
may try the defendant for being a criminal rather than for the particular
crime with which he or she is charged.7
The second step in the theory presents a further probative danger. There
is a grave risk that the jury will overestimate the probative value of the evi-
dence.8 The defendant's subjective character may have little relevance to the
issue of the defendant's conduct on a particular occasion.9 In fact, the availa-
ble psychological literature suggests that we can have little confidence in the
construct of character as a predictor of behavior.' 0 There may be little consis-
tency between a person's general subjective character and conduct at a specific
time."" The jury may give character far more weight than it deserves. 12
7. Comment, The Admissibility of Extraneous Offenses in Texas Criminal
Cases, 14 S. TEX. L.J. 69, 78 (1973).
8. A. CROSS & N. WILKINS, AN OUTLINE OF LAW OF EVIDENCE 172 (1964).
9. See Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Relevancy,
Competency, Privileges, Witnesses, Opinion and Expert Witnesses, 14 TULSA L.J. 227,
271 (1978); Comment, Evidence-Other Crimes-Balancing Relevance and Need
Against Unfair Prejudice to Determine the Admissibility of Other Unexplained Deaths
as Proof of the Corpus Delicti and the Perpetrator's Identity, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 173,
183-84 (1974).
10. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5239, at 436-37 (1978).
11. Larson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable
19851
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While the first sentence of Rule 404(b) prohibits the prosecutor from us-
ing a character theory for introducing the defendant's uncharged crimes, in
the next breath the second sentence leaves other avenues of admissibility open
to the prosecutor. The second sentence lists other theories for admissibility
that have so-called "independent" relevance, since the evidence is logically rel-
evant on a theory other than the hypothesis of using the defendant's bad char-
acter as circumstantial proof of bad conduct at the time of the charged
crime. 13 The plan theory"' is one of the most frequently invoked justifications
for introducing uncharged misconduct. 15 Moreover, the invocation is usually
successful. Although trial judges often rely on the plan theory as the basis for
admitting the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evidence, appellate courts
rarely rule the admission erroneous.' 6
The first section of this article advances the thesis that the courts have
frequently misapplied the plan theory. Paradoxically, the courts have at once
unduly contracted and unwarrantedly expanded the plan theory. At one ex-
treme, some courts have unnecessarily excluded relevant plan evidence. These
courts have fashioned rigid requirements that uncharged acts offered to show a
plan must be similar to the charged act, occur before the charged act, and be
introduced for a very limited number of purposes (such as proving the com-
mission of the act constituting the actus reus of the charged crime).17 At the
other extreme, many courts have sustained inadequate showings of the exis-
tence of a plan-showings that amounted to nothing more than proof that the
defendant committed uncharged crimes similar to the charged crimes. 8 In so
doing, the courts admitted evidence logically relevant only to the verboten is-
sue of the defendant's bad character.
It is bad enough that the courts have repeatedly misapplied the plan the-
ory for introducing evidence of the defendant's uncharged misconduct. The
thesis of the second section of this article is that the courts' misapplication of
the plan theory is a microcosm of the courts' mishandling of the uncharged
misconduct doctrine itself. On the one hand, many jurisdictions have adopted
the fallacious exclusionary conception of the uncharged misconduct doctrine.
Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 758, 778-81 (1975).
12. Elliott, The Young Person's Guide to Similar Fact Evidence-I, 1983 CRIM.
L. REV. 284, 287.
13. United States v. Forgione, 487 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1973); Vowell v.
State, 628 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982).
14. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
15. Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes: An Evidentiary Dilemma, 20 U. KAN.
L. REv. 411, 419-20 (1972); Note, Admissibility of Evidence Under Indiana's "Com-
mon Scheme or Plan" Exception, 53 IND. L.J. 805, 810 (1978); see also Annot., 47
A.L.R. FED. 781 (1980).
16. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140, at 140-41
(1978) ("[C]ases disapproving the receipt of such evidence for this purpose are few and
far between.").
17. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50
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Under this conception, the doctrine is viewed as a general rule forbidding the
receipt of evidence of the defendant's other crimes with specified exceptions
such as "plan." Even when evidence is independently relevant on a
noncharacter theory, this conception mandates the inadmissibility of the evi-
dence unless it falls within a pigeonhole exception previously approved by an
appellate court. Like the arbitrary limitations on the scope of the plan theory,
the exclusionary conception of the doctrine leads to the rejection of probative,
legitimate evidence.
On the other hand, many courts have developed talismanic theories, in-
cluding "res gestae," for admitting uncharged misconduct. Under this nebu-
lous rubric, the courts admit acts of uncharged misconduct whenever the un-
charged act occurred simultaneously with the charged crime. This talisman
has the same effect as the courts' acceptance of inadequate showings of plan:
the introduction of evidence relevant only to the defendant's bad character.
II. THE COURTS' MISAPPLICATION OF THE PLAN THEORY
The plan theory is only one of numerous noncharacter theories for admit-
ting evidence of a defendant's uncharged misconduct. Other recognized theo-
ries include the use of uncharged misconduct to prove the defendant's motive
to commit the charged crime'19 or the defendant's preparation for the commis-
sion of the charged crime.20 The definition or essence of the plan theory is that
the defendant has a goal in mind that encompasses both the charged and un-
charged crimes.2 ' The charged and uncharged crimes are different stages in
the execution of the plan.22 The defendant commits the charged and un-
charged crimes as means to an antecedent,2 3 pre-conceived,24 or pre-existing
25
end.
Suppose, for instance, that the defendant is charged with a March 1 bur-
glary of a store, including the theft of money from two strong boxes kept in
the inventory room. One strong box was forced open, and there are scratches
around the lock indicating that the burglar "jimmied" the lock. The other
strong box was opened during the burglary, but there is no evidence of forcible
19. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) specifically mentions "motive."
20. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5243
(1978).
21. Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 614, 616
(1973); Comment, Admissibility of Prior Criminal Acts as Substantive Evidence in
Criminal Prosecutions, 36 TENN. L. REV. 515, 521 (1969); Note, Evidence of Other
Crimes in Montana, 30 MONT. L. REV. 235, 236 (1969).
22. Comment, Evidence of Other Crimes as Substantive Proof of Guilt in Ma-
ryland, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 245, 259 (1980).
23. Slough, supra note 15, at 418-19.
24. Note, Admissibility of Other Offense Evidence After State v. Houghton, 25
S.D.L. REv. 166, 168 (1980).
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entry. The prosecutor has evidence that on January 1, the defendant burglar-
ized a hardware store and stole a tool that could be used as a "jimmy." The
prosecutor also has evidence that on February 1, the defendant burglarized the
store owner's private residence and stole the key to the second strong box. The
defendant is on trial for only the March 1 burglary. However, the first two
crimes obviously facilitated the commission of the March 1 burglary. The
three crimes are so naturally interconnected that there is a rational inference
that the defendant had in mind a plan including all three criminal acts.
Hence, the prosecutor's factual showing satisfies the definition of a plan.
At first glance, this definition of plan seems straightforward. It should be
a simple matter for the courts to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
that the defendant had a plan in mind.26 Yet the application of the plan theory
by the courts has often been erroneous.
A. The Undue Contraction of the Plan Theory
Several jurisdictions have narrowed the scope of the theory by imposing
additional limitations. One limitation is that the uncharged act must antedate
the charged crime. No less an authority than the chief justice of a state su-
preme court has written that "one's act committed subsequent to the crime
charged cannot possibly be relevant to establish a prior . . . plan and should
therefore be excluded. '2 7 Another limitation is that the uncharged crime must
be similar to the charged crime. In the past, the Indiana courts have enforced
a requirement that the two crimes be similar.2 8 Under this requirement, if the
uncharged act is dissimilar to the charged crime, the two crimes cannot consti-
tute parts of the same plan.29 A final limitation restricts the permissible pur-
poses for introducing plan evidence. In describing the legitimate uses of plan
evidence, it is often asserted that such evidence has only one or limited uses.30
The purposes most commonly mentioned are to prove the doing of the act and
26. Note, supra note 15, at 810 n.33; see, e.g., H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL Evi-
DENCE § 212 (5th ed. 1935); Mount, Ohio's "Similar Acts Statute" Another Interpre-
tation, 9 AKRON L. REV. 316, 324 (1975).
27. Krivosha, Lansworth & Pirsch, Relevancy: The Necessary Element in Us-
ing Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REV. 657,
672 (1981).
28. Note, supra note 15, at 808, 820 (citing Maldonado v. State, 355 N.E.2d
843, 847 (Ind. 1976)).
29. Id. at 808.
30. See, e.g., Herbert, Ohio's "Similar Acts Statute" A Prosecutor's Perspec-
tive, 9 AKRON L. REV. 302 (1975) ("two main uses"); Schroeder, Evidentiary Use in
Criminal Cases of Collateral Crimes and Acts: A Comparison of the Federal Rules
and Alabama Law, 35 ALA. L. REv. 241, 256-57 (1984); Comment, Evi-
dence-Availability of Evidence of Other Offenses, 35 MARQ. L. REv. 55, 59 (1951)
(listing only one legitimate use of plan evidence); Note, Admissibility of Evidence of
Similar Offenses in Criminal Prosecutions in West Virginia, 54 W. VA. L. REv. 142,
145-46 (1951) (listing only two legitimate uses).
[Vol. 50
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to prove the defendant's mens rea.31
All these limitations are unnecessary and unsound. First, there is no need
to confine the plan theory to uncharged acts antedating the charged crime.
The uncharged act does not have to occur prior to32 or contemporaneously
with the charged crime.33 Consider our original burglary hypothetical. Sup-
pose that the defendant were charged with the February 1 burglary of the
store owner's residence. During that burglary, the perpetrator stole the key to
a strong box at the store. The defendant's commission of the subsequent
March 1 burglary, in which that key was evidently used, is logically relevant
to prove the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the February 1 crime.
The uncharged act, the March 1 crime, would be probative even though it
occurred after the charged crime.
It is equally fallacious to insist that the uncharged act be similar to the
charged crime. 34 The charged and uncharged acts can be part of the same
plan even if the acts are dissimilar. Consider a variation of the burglary hypo-
thetical. In this variation, the January 1 crime is the brutal murder of the best
security guard at the store. The defendant wanted to ensure that the guard
would be unable to foil the March 1 burglary. The two offenses are dissimilar;
the March 1 crime is an offense against property while the other is a crime
against a person. One crime is nonviolent while the other may be violent to the
point of barbarity. Nevertheless, it is patent that both crimes can be part of
the same plan.
Finally, it is illogical to confine plan evidence to proof of the doing of the
act or even to that purpose plus proof of the the defendant's mens rea. The
following hypotheticals illustrate that, without violating the character prohibi-
tion in the first sentence of Rule 404(b), a prosecutor can fashion theories of
logical relevance to use plan evidence either to establish the defendant's iden-
tity as the criminal, the occurrence of the actus reus, the defendant's mens
rea, or to disprove an affirmative defense such as entrapment.
Plan evidence can be material on a noncharacter theory to prove the de-
fendant's identity as the perpetrator of the charged crime.3 5 Most persons are
law-abiding citizens; not all persons plan to commit crimes, much less the spe-
cific crime with which a defendant is charged. Proof that the defendant
planned to commit the charged crime, therefore, is probative of the defen-
31. See authorities cited supra note 30.
32. Note, Admissibility of Prior Crimes in a Prosecution for Forgery, 10 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 263, 264 (1936).
33. Note, supra note 15, at 808.
34. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 6 U. KAN. L. REV. 38, 49 (1957); Note, Evi-
dence: Admissibility of Other Crimes to Establish a Common Scheme or Plan-Hall
v. State, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 103, 108-09 (1984); Comment, A Proposed Analytical
Method for the Determination of the Admissibility of Evidence of Other Offenses in
California, 7 UCLA L. REV. 463, 471-72 (1960); see, e.g., United States v. Lamb, 575
F.2d 1310, 1316 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978).
35. Herbert, supra note 30, at 309.
1985]
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dant's identity as the perpetrator. The evidence tends to set the defendant
apart from innocent persons who did not entertain the plan.38 The intermedi-
ate inference is the defendant's act of entertaining the plan, rather than any
forbidden character inference.
Similarly, plan evidence may be pertinent to prove the commission of an
actus reus.37 Assume that the defendant is charged with murder. The defen-
dant (A) and the victim (B) were sisters and potential heirs to an estate. There
were two other potential heirs, also sisters (C and D). The victim died while
hiking with the defendant, and the defendant claims that the cause of death
was a natural, fortuitous accident-the victim slipped on a boulder and fell to
her death. There is no real question of identity because the defendant admits
accompanying her sister. The pivotal question is whether the cause of B's
death was an accident (slipping) or homicide (a push). It would be logically
relevant for the prosecutor to show that the defendant had made attempts on
C's and D's lives. Those attempts tend to show the existence of the defendant's
plan to eliminate other competing claimants to the estate. In turn, the fact
that someone was planning the murder of all the other heirs (including B)
reduces the objective likelihood that B's death was fortuitous. That objective
probability, rather than the defendant's subjective disposition, is the interme-
diate inference.
Plan evidence can also be used to prove the defendant's possession of the
requisite mens rea for the crime. 38 Suppose that the defendant, a bookkeeper,
is charged with embezzling from his company in December. In that month,
the defendant made several demonstrably erroneous entries in the company
books. The defendant claims that those mistakes were innocent clerical mis-
takes. The prosecutor's version of the facts is that the defendant embezzled
money from the company to pay his large gambling debts. The prosecutor has
evidence that in November, the defendant made other mistaken entries and
used the money to pay off part of the same gambling debt. The uncharged
November embezzlement would be material to show that the defendant pos-
sessed the required mens rea, animus furandi, in December. 9
36. See, e.g., People v. Love, 111 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 8-11, 168 Cal. Rptr.
591, 591-97 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1980); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5244, at 501 (1978); Herbert, supra note 30, at
309.
37. People v. Love, Ill Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 11-12, 168 Cal. Rptr. 591, 597-
98 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1980); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5244, at 502 (1978); Note, Admissibility in Criminal Prosecu-
tions of Proof of Other Offenses as Substantive Evidence, 3 VAND. L. REV. 779, 783-84
(1950).
38. People v. Love, Ill Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 10, 168 Cal. Rptr. 591, 597 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1980); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5244, at 502 (1978); Note, supra note 32, at 266; Note, supra note 37,
at 784; Note, supra note 30, at 145-48.
39. People v. Rice, 206 Mich. 644, 173 N.W. 495 (1919); State v. Wilson, 72
Minn. 522, 75 N.W. 715 (1898); see also Commonwealth v. Lubinsky, 182 Mass. 142,
[Vol. 50
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Plan evidence may even be pertinent to disprove an affirmative defense.
Assume that the defendant contends that the police entrapped him into com-
mitting the crime; the police implanted the idea for the crime in his mind and
pressured the defendant into committing the crime.4 It would certainly be
logically relevant for the prosecution to show that, even before the initial po-
lice contact with the defendant, the defendant had begun planning the charged
crime. The plan evidence would be material even if the evidence took the form
of an earlier uncharged act tending to show the plan's existence. Whether the
prosecutor's theory is the negative purpose of overcoming a defense or the af-
firmative purpose of establishing identity, actus reus, or mens rea, plan evi-
dence can be relevant to a material fact of consequence in the case.41 In each
hypothetical, the prosecutor can establish the materiality of the evidence with-
out relying on the intermediate inference that the defendant has an immoral
or law-breaking character.
B. The Undue Expansion of the Plan Theory
It is inexcusable that many courts arbitrarily restrict plan evidence to
prior, similar crimes offered to prove the commission of the actus reus or the
defendant's mens rea. Many courts compound the error by accepting inade-
quate showings of the existence of a true plan when the prosecutor offers evi-
dence of a prior, similar crime for one of these two purposes and invokes the
label "plan." To satisfy the definition of a true plan, the prosecution must
shoulder the burden of proving that in fact and in mind,42 the defendant con-
ceived of a goal or objective larger than commission of the individual crimes.43
There are three recurring fact patterns in which the court may be justi-
fied in inferring the existence of a broader plan. One pattern can be called a
sequential plan.4 ' In a sequential plan, one crime is predicated on the other.45
For example, in the original burglary hypothetical, the defendant stole the key
to a strongbox from the store owner's private residence before using the key in
the subsequent store burglary. One crime naturally precedes the other. There
are numerous examples of sequential plans. The defendant steals the key to a
64 N.E. 966 (1902).
40. United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984).
41. FED. R. EvID. 401 states the modern standard of materiality.
42. 1 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 207 (5th ed. 1956); Mount, supra
note 26, at 324; Note, supra note 15, at 810.
43. United States v. Adcock, 558 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 921 (1977); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5244, at 503 n.29 (1978); 1 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 207 (5th ed.
1935); Note, supra note 34, at 113, 115; Comment, Admissibility of Prior Criminal
Acts as Substantive Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 36 TENN. L. REV. 515, 521
(1969).
44. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140 (1978).
45. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 227
(2d ed. 1982). The first crime facilitates or prepares the way for the second crime.
Note, supra note 34, at 112.
1985]
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till and later steals money from the till;4" the defendant first steals instruments
needed to carry out the second crime;47 the defendant gives a minor marijuana
to lower her resistance to his subsequent sexual advances;48 or the defendant
stages one holdup to determine whether his co-conspirators are qualified to
pull off a later, more difficult mail truck robbery.'9 When the earlier crime is a
necessary preliminary to the later crime, there is clearly a rational inference of
the existence of a broader goal inspiring the earlier crime.50
The court is also warranted in inferring the existence of a larger objective
in the chain plan fact pattern. Think back to the hiking hypothetical. The
defendant is charged with murdering another potential heir to the estate. The
prosecutor has evidence that the defendant made attempts on the lives of two
other heirs, C and D.51 The broader objective is obtaining the estate. The
murders of all the other heirs are links in a chain of crimes leading to the
attainment of the broader objective. A chain plan differs from a sequential one
because, in a chain plan, the defendant does not have to commit the crimes in
any particular sequence. However, to achieve the objective, the defendant
must commit several crimes, including the uncharged crimes. There are nu-
merous examples of chain plans. The defendant may need to bribe enough
supervisors to have a majority of votes before a city council. 2 The defendant
may need to attack and incapacitate all of a company's nonunion truck drivers
to force the company to bargain with the defendant's union.53 The very nature
of the objective creates an absolute or relative necessity that the defendant
commit several crimes. There is a much stronger relationship between the
crimes than mere similarity.5" In the case of both sequential and chain plans,
the crimes are so logically interrelated that the obviousness of the connection
to any reasonable person is circumstantial evidence of the defendant's state of
mind.
There is a third fact pattern in which the court is arguably justified in
finding a true plan. In the case of sequential and chain plans, there is not only
an inference that the defendant has a larger objective in mind. The objective is
46. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 215 (3d ed. 1t940).
47. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51
HARv. L. REV. 988, 1009 (1938).
48. United States v. Gano, 560 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1977).
49. United States v. Carroll, 510 F.2d 507, 509 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 923 (1976).
50. United States v. Torres, 685 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1982).
51. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5244, at 501 & n.15 (1978); C. FRICKE, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE 334 (9th ed. 1978);
Comment, supra note 43, at 521; Note, Admissibility of Similar Crimes: 1901-51, 18
BROOKLYN L. REV. 80, 101 (1951).
52. Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic
Approach, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 297, 308 (1982); Comment, supra note 34, at 472-73
& n.45.
53. Peats v. State, 213 Ind. 560, 12 N.E.2d 270 (1938); Note, supra note 15, at
812-13.
54. Note, supra note 15, at 812-13; Note, supra note 51, at 101-05.
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also identifiable. The court can review the sequence of burglaries and infer
that the store burglary was predicated upon the burglary of the private resi-
dence. The court can infer from the number of attempted bribes that the de-
fendant wanted to muster a majority on the city council for the ordinance he
was proposing. In some cases, however, even when the court cannot identify
the objective, the court might be justified in concluding that there was a
broader objective in the defendant's mind. Consider, for example, a number of
killings committed by a serial murderer. The Juan Corona case in California is
illustrative.55 Corona maintained a ledger which referred to both the victims
named in the pleadings and other, uncharged victims. A defendant's writings
or oral declarations"6 may give rise to an inference that a number of crimes
are connected in his or her mind even though the defendant's overall objective
is unclear. If a defendant's statements show that the crimes are connected5 7 or
interlocking,58 the court may plausibly infer the existence of a broader objec-
tive even though the objective cannot be identified. Given the bizarre, often
warped, motivation of serial murderers, it should not be surprising that their
objectives may not be readily apparent to normal minds. As long as the court
can infer the existence of a larger plan encompassing the uncharged crime, the
court can admit the plan evidence without relying on an intermediate infer-
ence of the defendant's bad character.
Many courts, however, have purported to find plans even when the prose-
cutor's foundation did not fit within any of the three fact patterns mentioned
above. 59 There is no proof that the crimes follow any particular sequence,
there is no evident overall objective, and the defendant has made no state-
ments indicating the crimes are interconnected in his or her mind. All the
prosecutor proves is the defendant's commission of several, similar crimes
within a short time period.60 Some courts tend routinely to admit evidence of
similar, proximate crimes, especially when the charged crime is a burglary6 or
drug offense,62 on the stated justification that the uncharged and charged
crimes are part of the same plan.
55. People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978).
56. See Hicks v. State, 389 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 99.
57. Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 8, 36 (1979) (summary of State v. Thorne, 43 Wash.
2d 47, 260 P.2d 331 (1953)).
58. E. FISCH, NEw YORK EVIDENCE § 214 (2d ed. 1977).
59. See Thomas, Looking Logically at Evidence of Other Crimes in Oklahoma,
15 OKLA. L. REV. 431, 441 (1962); Note, supra note 34, at 108, 110, 112, 115.
60. United States v. Baykowski, 615 F.2d 767, 769, 773 (8th Cir. 1980); Wil-
liams, The Problem of Similar Fact Evidence, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 281, 323 (1979);
Thomas, supra note 59, at 441.
61. Perry v. People, 116 Colo. 440, 181 P.2d 439 (1947); 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5244, at 500 n.9 (1978); Melville,
Evidence as to Similar Offenses, Acts or Transactions in Criminal Cases, 29 DICTA,
235, 241 (1952).
62. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5244, at 500 n.9 (1978).
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Although the defendant's other similar, proximate offenses are logically
relevant to prove the existence of a plan, standing alone they are insufficient to
show a plan. A plan requires an overall objective tying the crimes together.63
There is a permissive inference of the existence of an overall objective in the
case of sequential and chain plans and when the defendant's own statements
connect the crimes. However, even if the defendant commits several similar
crimes, each individual crime could be "the result of an impulse born of the
moment. ' 64 When the prosecutor's only foundational evidence is proof of the
commission of several similar crimes, the only plan proven is a spurious "plan
to commit a series of acts" of the same type. 5
It is true that there is an alternative, legitimate theory for admitting evi-
dence of the defendant's uncharged crimes: unique modus operandi.66 Under
this theory, the prosecutor shows that the defendant committed an uncharged
crime with the same distinctive modus operandi as the charged crime.67 The
use of the same peculiar modus operandi in both crimes shows that both
crimes were perpetrated by "one and the same man."68 To invoke this founda-
tion, the prosecutor must establish not only that the charged and uncharged
crimes have similarities 9 but also that the modus operandi in both crimes was
exceptional,70 idiosyncratic,71 or singular. 72 The burglar who always left the
bathroom scale by the front door 3 and the killer who invariably shot his vic-
tims near the fourth cervical vertabra7 4 are good illustrations of the requisite
degree of uniqueness. Standing alone, even a large number of similarities be-
tween the charged and uncharged crimes is insufficient to establish a unique
63. 1 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 207 (5th ed. 1956); Mount, supra
note 26, at 324; Note, supra note 15, at 810.
64. State v. Buxton, 324 Mo. 78, 84, 22 S.W.2d 635, 637 (1929).
65. Note, supra note 15, at 811-12; see also Note, supra note 34, at 108, 112,
115.
66. See United States v. Baldarrama, 566 F.2d 560 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 844 (1978); United States v. Park, 525 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Rodriguez, 68 Cal. App. 3d 874,
137 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977); People v. Alvarez, 44 Cal. App. 3d 375, 118 Cal. Rptr. 602(1975); People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 444 P.2d 91, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1968);
Comment, Admissibility of Evidence Disclosing Other Crimes, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 75
(1954).
67. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5246
(1978).
68. R. v. Morris, 54 Crim. App. 69, 80 (1970); Williams, supra note 60, at
307-08.
69. Messenger v. State, 638 S.W.2d 883, 886-87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
70. Williams, supra note 60, at 307.
71. United States v. Solomon, 490 F. Supp. 373, 375 (S.D. Ga. 1980); Bates,
What Happened After Boardman, 1978 N.Z.L.J. 178, 180.
72. Note, supra note 15, at 808.
73. Comment, supra note 22, at 258.
74. People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 790
(1946); Comment, supra note 34, at 475; Note, Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of
Previous Crime: Instructions to Jury, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 131, 132 & n.1 (1947).
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modus operandi. 5 The points of similarity may be common or hackneyed7 6
methods of committing that type of crime.
In most spurious plan cases, the prosecutor could not invoke the alterna-
tive, modus operandi theory to justify the admission of the evidence of similar
crimes. In many such, cases, the evidence is logically irrelevant on that theory
because the crimes were not committed with a unique modus operandi. 7 The
modus simply is not idiosyncratic. In other cases, the evidence is legally irrele-
vant because the issue of the defendant's identity was not in dispute.78 The
defendant may admit his identity as the perpetrator of the act but defend on
the ground of lack of mens rea or an affirmative defense such as self-defense.
In either event, the prosecutor cannot rationalize the admission of the evidence
on a modus operandi theory.
In the spurious plan cases,79 the net effect of the court's acceptance of the
plan theory is the erroneous admission of evidence of the defendant's bad
character, 80 disposition,81 and propensity.8 2 The prosecutor has shown that the
defendant has repeatedly committed the same or a similar crime, 83 but that
evidence proves only that the defendant is a professional burglar or drug
dealer.84 The California Supreme Court recently surveyed earlier California
''plan" cases and concluded that those cases had diluted the plan theory to the
point that "plan" had become a euphemism for disposition.85
75. United States v. Ezzell, 644 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603, 611 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); United
States v. Webb, 466 F.2d 1352, 1353 (9th Cir. 1972). But see United States v. Woods,
613 F.2d 629, 635 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920 (1980); 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5239, at 462-63 (1978).
76. United States v. Ezzell, 644 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981); People v.
Guerrero, 16 Cal. 3d 719, 724-25, 548 P.2d 366, 368-69, 129 Cal. Rptr. 166, 168-69
(1976); see also People v. Wein, 69 Cal. App. 3d 79, 89-90, 137 Cal. Rptr. 814, 820
(1977).
77. United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 501-02 (11th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1153 (5th Cir. 1974); Note, Evidence-Relevance
and Materiality-Similar Fact Evidence to Show Plan or Scheme, 2 ARIz. L. REv.
140, 142 (1960); Recent Case, Evidence-Other Crimes-Admissibility of Evidence of
Prior Crimes Having Features Common to Crime Charged, 13 VAND. L. REV. 394, 395
(1959); see also Comment, Defining Standards for Determining the Admissibility of
Evidence of Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA L. REV. 261, 279 (1977).
78. People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1984).
79. Note, supra note 51, at 104-05.
80. Comment, supra note 77, at 279.
81. Recent Case, supra note 77, at 395-96.
82. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5244, at 500 n.9 (1978).
83. Note, supra note 15, at 812-13.
84. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5244, at 500 n.9 (1978).
85. People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 89, 679 P.2d 1, 8, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 574
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In short, many courts have admitted evidence of similar, uncharged
crimes on a plan theory when (1) the modus operandi was not unique, and (2)
the prosecutor's foundation included no evidence of a sequential plan, a chain
plan, or the defendant's statements tying the crimes together. Under the rubric
of "plan," these courts are admitting illicit character evidence in blatant viola-
tion of the common law character prohibition and the first sentence in Rule
404(b).
III. THE PLAN THEORY AS A MICROCOSM OF THE COURTS'
MISAPPLICATION OF THE UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT DOCTRINE
In the last section, we noted the flaws in the courts' application of the
plan theory for admitting uncharged misconduct evidence. At one extreme,
some courts unnecessarily exclude probative evidence that has independent rel-
evance by restricting plan evidence to prior, similar acts offered for certain,
approved purposes. At the other extreme, under the "plan" banner, some
courts overlook the necessity for proof of a true plan connecting the various
crimes and improperly admit prior, similar acts relevant only to the defen-
dant's bad character. These flaws, unfortunately, are not confined to the plan
theory; they are symptomatic of more pervasive errors infecting fundamental
aspects of the uncharged misconduct doctrine.
A. The Undue Contraction of the Uncharged Misconduct Doctrine
As we have seen, many courts arbitrarily limit the plan theory to evidence
of prior, similar acts offered either to prove the very doing of the act or the
defendant's mens rea. Rather than independently assessing the logical rele-
vance of evidence proffered on a plan theory, these courts pay undue deference
to past precedents and tend to admit only evidence that, for example, is of-
fered for purposes previously approved in the reported cases. The same illib-
eral attitude has distorted the very conception of the uncharged misconduct
doctrine.
There are two competing formulations of the doctrine: the inclusionary
and exclusionary approaches.8 6 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) epitomizes
the inclusionary approach. The first sentence of the rule forbids the prosecutor
from invoking one (and only one) theory of logical relevance: "Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. '8 7 The second
sentence legitimates or includes any other theory of logical relevance for such
evidence: "It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident."881 The courts of appeal for the First, Second, Fourth,
86. See generally Stone, supra note 47.
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Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits all have concluded that Rule 404(b)
embodies the inclusionary approach permitting the introduction of relevant un-
charged misconduct evidence on any theory other than the solitary theory
banned in the first sentence of the rule.8 The theories expressly listed in the
second sentence of Rule 404(b) are merely examples of theories that might
possess legitimate, independent relevance in a particular case."
The exclusionary approach to the doctrine stands in sharp contrast.
Under this conception, the doctrine consists of two elements: (1) a general rule
excluding evidence of the defendant's uncharged misconduct, and (2) a list of
recognized exceptions to the rule such as motive, plan, and identity.9" This
conception was the inspiration for the widely-used MIMIC mnemonic for the
uncharged misconduct doctrine: MIMIC - M(otive)-I(ntent)-M(istake or acci-
dent)-I(dentity)-C(ommon scheme or plan).9 2 Under this conception, evidence
of the defendant's uncharged misconduct is automatically inadmissible unless
it fits squarely within one of the previously approved exceptions.9 3 Thus, the
exclusionary approach mechanically excludes evidence falling outside the rec-
ognized exceptions even when the evidence is relevant on a non-character the-
ory. At one time, the exclusionary approach was dominant in three-fifths of
the states94 and the majority of the federal circuits.95 Although there was sub-
stantial movement toward the inclusionary approach in the past decade, the
exclusionary approach may still be the majority view among the state courts.9 6
The exclusionary approach still has adherents among the federal courts.9 7
The leading historian of the uncharged misconduct doctrine in the United
States, Professor Julius Stone, vehemently attacked the exclusionary approach
as spurious. 98 His criticism is well-founded. The exclusionary approach is un-
sound in principle; it routinely excludes evidence that is indistinguishable in
terms of probative value and danger from evidence that the approach admits
as a matter of course.
One of the most celebrated modern uncharged misconduct cases, United
89. Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 113, 159-60 (1984).
90. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5240
(1978).
91. Stone, supra note 47, at 1001-02.
92. Comment, supra note 22, at 246 n.6.
93. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE
OF CRIMINAL CASES § 368 (3d ed. 1974).
94. Chesnutt, The Admissibility of Other Crimes in Texas, 50 TEx. L. REV.
1409 n.4 (1972); Stone, supra note 47, at 1036 n.221.
95. Reed, supra note 89, at 113.
96. Schroeder, supra note 30, at 247 n. 42; Comment, Rule 404(b) Limits the
Admission of Other Crimes Evidence, Under an Inclusionary Approach, to Cases
Where It Is Relevant to an Issue in Dispute, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 574, 580 n.36
(1980).
97. Reed, supra note 89, at 160-61.
98. Stone, supra note 47, at 1027.
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States v. Woods,"9 illustrates the clash between the inclusionary and exclu-
sionary approaches. In Woods, the defendant was charged with infanticide.
The defendant's foster son died as a result of cyanosis, a condition caused by
lack of oxygen. The defendant claimed that the death was an accident. The
prosecution offered evidence that nine children in the defendant's custody had
suffered a minimum of twenty cases of cyanosis. The trial judge admitted the
evidence over the defense's objection. A divided Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed. The dissent argued that in the past, the court had
admitted uncharged misconduct under only a "limited" number of "circum-
scribed" theories. 100 It added that proof of the corpus delicti-establishing
that the death was due to an actus reus rather than natural accident-was not
one of the previously approved exceptions to the bar on uncharged misconduct
evidence. The dissent was a vintage application of the exclusionary approach.
The majority agreed that proof of the corpus delicti was not a recognized the-
ory for admitting uncharged misconduct in the Fourth Circuit. 10 1 However,
the majority dismissed the exclusionary approach as rigid "pigeonholing.' °2
The majority endorsed the inclusionary approach by asserting that "evidence
of other offenses may be received, if relevant, for any purpose other than to
show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit
the crime."103
Woods is a textbook illustration of the weaknesses of the exclusionary
approach. Under the aegis of the exclusionary approach, the dissent would
have uncritically excluded the uncharged misconduct. Yet the exclusion is cer-
tainly not justifiable on the ground that the evidence is logically irrelevant.
The evidence of the twenty cyanotic incidents had independent, logical rele-
vance. As the first sentence in Rule 404(b) acknowledges,'" the character evi-
dence rules forbid the prosecutor from offering uncharged misconduct to es-
tablish the defendant's personal, subjective disposition as a wrongdoer and, in
turn, inferring the defendant's guilt from the defendant's subjective charac-
ter.10 However, in Woods, the prosecutor was not relying on the defendant's
subjective character as the intermediate inference. Rather, the prosecutor was
invoking the doctrine of chances.108 Based on ordinary common sense 107 and
99. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
100. Id. at 140 (Widener, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 133-34.
102. Id. at 134 (quoting C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 453 (2d ed. 1972)).
103. 484 F.2d at 134.
104. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
105. Turcott, Similar Fact Evidence: The Boardman Legacy, 21 CRIM. L.Q. 43,
46, 48, 54 (1979).
106. Carter, The Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Facts, 69 LAW Q. REV.
80, 85 (1953).
107. Carter, The Admissibility of Similar Facts, 70 LAW Q. REV. 214, 237-38(1954).
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mundane human experience,108 it is objectively unlikely that such a large num-
ber of unfortunate accidents would have befallen Mrs. Woods' children in a
short period of time.109 Considered in isolation, each cyanotic incident might
have been easily explicable as an accident." 0 However, when all the incidents
were considered collectively, the doctrine of chances created an inference of
human design."" The sheer number of the incidents objectively reduced the
probability of accident." 2 To decide whether to accept the prosecutor's theory,
the jurors were not required to focus on the question of the defendant's subjec-
tive character and inquire whether the defendant was an immoral, law-break-
ing person. Their focus would be the objective likelihood of accident given the
large number of similar incidents within a short time span.
Nor was the evidence proffered in Woods distinguishable from evidence
routinely admissible under the exclusionary approach in terms of the quantum
of probative value. The quantum of probative value of a particular item of
evidence in a specific case largely depends upon the extent of dispute over the
fact that the item is offered to establish.1 3 In Woods, the central issue was
whether the child's death was accidental or the result of human intervention.
Under the doctrine of chances, the evidence of the twenty cyanotic episodes
was persuasive on that issue. If the pivotal issue in Woods had been identity
and the prosecutor had offered evidence of uncharged crimes committed by
Mrs. Woods with the same, unique modus operandi, the dissent would un-
doubtedly have approved the admission of the evidence. The incidents offered
in Woods to disprove accident have as much probative worth as any uncharged
misconduct evidence that could have been offered to prove identity, if identity
had been the point of dispute.
Finally, the uncharged misconduct offered in Woods cannot be distin-
guished from evidence that would be routinely admissible under the exclusion-
ary approach in terms of the probative dangers posed by the evidence. In the
main, the degree of probative danger posed by uncharged misconduct depends
on the factors of the reprehensibility of the uncharged act",4 and the degree of
similarity between the charged and uncharged crimes. 15 The more repugnant
108. Id.
109. Comment, supra note 9, at 174.
110. Id. at 173-74.
111. Note, Evidence-Proof of Particular Facts-Evidence that Defendant May
Have Committed Similar Crimes is Admissible to Prove Corpus Delicti of Murder, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1074, 1080 (1974).
112. Note, Evidence-Proof of Prior Events Admissible Generally and Specifi-
cally to Demonstrate Corpus Delicti Because the Relevance of and the Need for the
Evidence Outweighed Its Prejudicial Impact, 52 TEx. L. REV. 585, 589-90 (1974).
113. Comment, supra note 96, at 582.
114. Roth, supra note 52, at 300.
115. 7 J.L. REF. 535, 544 (1974); see also Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the
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the act, the greater is the danger that the act will poison the jurors' minds'16
and create an overmastering hostility against the defendant."17 Furthermore,
the greater the similarity between the charged and uncharged crimes, the
more acute is the risk that the jury will draw a forbidden character inference
from the evidence.' 18 The jury may reason simplistically that if the defendant
performed the act once, he or she is likely to have done it again. With these
factors in mind, it is clear that it would be arbitrary to bar the uncharged
misconduct offered in Woods. Under the modus operandi theory sanctioned by
the exclusionary approach, the prosecutor would be permitted to offer evidence
of brutal murders and sordid sex crimes so long as they were committed in the
same, peculiar fashion as the charged crime. In addition, the admission of
strikingly similar crimes under the modus theory might place greater strain on
the character rules than the admission of the cyanotic incidents in Woods. The
doctrine of chances requires proof that the charged and uncharged incidents
are generally similar, but the modus theory demands a higher degree of simi-
larity. Under that theory, the crimes must be "nearly identical."'19 In this
respect, the uncharged misconduct in Woods was less objectionable than evi-
dence that would be admitted as a matter of course under the exclusionary
approach.
The parallel to the plan theory is evident. When evidence is proffered
under the plan theory, numerous courts refuse to engage in independent logi-
cal relevance analysis; they admit uncharged misconduct only if the prosecutor
offers the evidence for purposes previously approved by the appellate courts.
The courts' refusal leads to the needless exclusion of probative evidence that
would not offend the character rules. The exclusionary approach to the un-
charged misconduct doctrine has the same effect but on a larger scale. If the
evidence does not seem to fall within the scope of a previously sanctioned the-
ory, the courts refuse to undertake an independent logical relevance analysis
and reflexively bar the evidence. Neither these restrictions on the plan theory
nor the exclusionary conception of the uncharged misconduct doctrine can
withstand close scrutiny.
B. The Undue Expansion of the Uncharged Misconduct Doctrine
As we have seen, the plan theory suffers not only from the imposition of
arbitrary limitations by some courts; the administration of the theory has a
second flaw. In many jurisdictions, when the prosecutor invokes the theory, the
courts neglect to insist upon adequate proof of the existence of a true plan in
the defendant's mind. The existence of the plan is a preliminary fact condi-
116. 1 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 205-06 (5th ed. 1956).
117. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 404[18] (1982).
118. 7 J.L. REF. 535, 544 (1974).
119. Mount, supra note 26, at 336; Note, supra note 15, at 818 (quoting Bigger-
staff v. State, 266 Ind. 148, 152, 361 N.E.2d 895, 897 (1977)).
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tioning the admissibility of the evidence on a plan theory.120 To establish the
existence of the preliminary fact, the prosecutor should present proof of a se-
quential plan, a chain plan, or the defendant's statements showing the crimes
were interconnected. In the spurious plan cases, the courts overlook the neces-
sity for proof of the Rreliminary fact and are content with a showing that the
defendant committed similar crimes within a short time period. The result is
the admission of improper character evidence.
This lax attitude toward preliminary facts conditioning the admissibility
of uncharged misconduct is not confined to the plan theory. The same attitude
has distorted another theory for admitting uncharged misconduct, the res ges-
tae theory.12' In this context, the major transaction is the crime, and the inci-
dent event, the res gestae, is the uncharged offense. The rationale of the res
gestae theory is that the uncharged act forms part of the context of the
charged crime122 and that the jury needs to know the context to evaluate the
evidence of the charged crime."23 The uncharged act tends to explain the
charged crime."24
Properly understood, the res gestae theory is defensible. The stated justifi-
cation for admitting the uncharged crime is that it explains the charged
crime."25 The theory is viable if the charged crime requires some explanation
and the uncharged crime is logically relevant to furnish that explanation with-
out relying on a forbidden character inference. Consider a simple example.
Suppose the defendant is charged with assaulting a police officer when the
officer stopped the defendant to issue a minor traffic citation. The police officer
will testify that the defendant attacked him even after the officer made it clear
that he was stopping the defendant for a trivial infraction and that the fine
would be only five dollars. At first blush, the jury may find such testimony
difficult to believe because the assault seems so senseless and inexplicable."2
However, the prosecution has evidence that the defendant had a large quantity
of marijuana concealed in the car. This uncharged misconduct tends to explain
the charged crime. The illegal possession of contraband might furnish the mo-
tive for the attack on the officer because the defendant might have suspected
that the officer detected the marijuana odor emanating from the trunk. Motive
is a well-accepted, noncharacter theory for admitting uncharged misconduct
120. See FED. R. EvID. 104.
121. 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140 (1978).
122. Carter v. United States, 549 F.2d 77, 78 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1971); Survey, Seventeenth Annual Survey of De-
velopments in Virginia Law: 1971-72, 58 VA. L. REV. 1158, 1274-76 (1972).
123. Kemper v. State, 643 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
124. Ohio Decisions, Criminal Law-Admissibility of Prior Criminal
Acts-Testimony Referring to the Prior Criminal Acts as Verbal Act of the Res Ges-
tae, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 419, 420 (1979).
125. Id.
126. Moses v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 409, 412, 328 S.W.2d 885, 887 (1959);
Chesnutt, supra note 94, at 1425.
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evidence. 127 The prosecutor is not relying on the weak character inference that
the drug offense shows that the defendant is willing to commit crimes and that
that willingness or disposition increases the likelihood that the defendant com-
mitted another crime, the assault. Rather, the prosecutor has a more specific
and persuasive theory: The drug offense directly supplied the motive for the
assault.
When the prosecution invokes the res gestae theory, the judge should de-
mand that the prosecution establish two foundational elements: (1) from the
perspective of the typical lay juror, some aspect or feature of the charged
crime requires explanation, and (2) the uncharged misconduct furnishes that
explanation without running afoul of the character prohibition. In practice,
just as many courts ignore the requirement for proof of a true plan in the
defendant's mind, they disregard the necessity for proof of these two elements.
In many jurisdictions, under the res gestae rubric, the courts tend to admit
evidence of any uncharged crime that the defendant commits simultaneously
with the charged crime.128 This tendency is especially pronounced in cases in-
volving simultaneous drug transactions, killings, and thefts . 29 In a drunk driv-
ing prosecution, for example, one court held that the prosecutor may prove
that at the time of arrest, the defendant had a pistol on his person." 0 The
courts repeatedly protest that the uncharged act is explanatory for the jury.' 3
The courts, however, almost never bother to specify the aspect of the charged
crime requiring explanation or the explanation itself. 32
The effect of the courts' neglect of the foundational elements underlying
the res gestae theory is the same as the impact of their inattention to the need
for proof of the defendant's bad character. The uncharged misconduct is ex-
planatory only in the sense that it evidences the defendant's disposition toward
crime. The temporal simultaneity of the charged and uncharged crimes does
not guarantee the legitimate logical relevance of the uncharged crime. 133 It is
127. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5240
(1978).
128. Reese v. Wainwright, 600 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 983 (1979); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
225 (2d ed. 1982); Turcott, supra note 105, at 60; Williams, supra note 60, at 296-97;
Comment, supra note 43, at 526-27.
129. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 404[16] (1982); 2
D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140 (1978).
130. Ross v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 313, 314, 334 S.W.2d 174, 175 (1960); Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 73; see also Kolbert v. State, 644 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982); Dickson v. State, 642 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
131. Burgett v. State, 646 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Williams v.
State, 646 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Garrett v. State, 639 S.W.2d 18, 20(Tex. Ct. App.), aff'd, 658 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc).
132. Comment, supra note 22, at 260.
133. United States v. Levy, 731 F.2d 997, 1002-04 (2d Cir. 1984); 2 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[18] (1982); K. REDDEN & S.
SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 133 (2d ed. 1982); 1 F. WHAR-
TON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 242 (13th ed. 1972); Note, Evidence of Defendant's Other
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neither necessary nor sufficient that the two crimes be contemporaneous.
Whether the uncharged crime occurs before, during, or after the commission
of the charged crime, the prosecutor must prove up the elements establishing
that the uncharged act is logically relevant on a noncharacter theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
In administering both the plan theory and the larger uncharged miscon-
duct doctrine, many courts have fallen into error. The courts have unjustifiably
narrowed the theory and doctrine by imposing arbitrary restrictions on un-
charged misconduct evidence. At the same time, in other cases the courts have
treated "plan" and "res gestae" as talismans allowing the admission of im-
proper character evidence. Initially, these developments seem contradictory.
The courts are, at the same time, unduly tightening and relaxing the require-
ments for admission of uncharged misconduct. However, the paradox is more
apparent than real. The developments are not contradictory, for each error has
the identical root cause: flawed logical relevance analysis. The only possible
antidote for the ills of the uncharged misconduct doctrine is radical in the
classical sense: a return to fundamentals of logical relevance and a willingness
in the future to subject each item of uncharged misconduct to independent,
painstaking logical relevance analysis.
Whenever the prosecutor proffers uncharged misconduct evidence, the
trial judge should engage in the following sequence of analysis. At the outset,
the trial judge should insist that the prosecutor articulate a complete theory of
logical relevance, including all intermediate inferences. Many of the accepted
"theories" for the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence, including plan
and modus operandi, are not complete theories of logical relevance. Plan and
modus operandi usually function as intermediate inferences or facta proban-
tia.13 4 The ultimate facts are the facta probanda 35 including the commission
of an actus reus, the defendant's identity as the actor, and the defendant's
possession of the requisite mens rea. A judge should never accept the prosecu-
tor's statement that he or she is offering uncharged misconduct to show
"plan," "modus operandi," or "res gestae." Those terms are shorthand, ellipti-
cal expressions, and the judge must demand an explicit statement of the com-
plete theory of relevance. The trial judge cannot begin to assess intelligently
the propriety of the prosecutor's proffer until the prosecutor sets out the entire
theory.
After learning the theory, the judge must test the theory under the com-
mon law character prohibition or the first sentence of Rule 404(b), barring the
use of uncharged misconduct as character evidence.13 6 Suppose, for example,
the prosecutor offers uncharged misconduct under the res gestae doctrine.
Crimes: Admissibility in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REv. 608, 613 (1953).
134. Stone, supra note 47, at 1026 n.190.
135. Id.
136. FED R. EvID. 404(b).
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When the judge presses for a more explicit statement of the theory of logical
relevance, the prosecutor initially says, "The uncharged act tends to explain
the charged crime." When the judge presses further, the prosecutor adds,
"The defendant's willingness to commit the uncharged crime increases the
probability that he would be willing to commit the charged crime." At that
point, the judge should rule the evidence inadmissible. The prosecutor has ver-
balized the precise theory of logical relevance verboten by the character rules
and Rule 404(b).
Even if the prosecutor articulates a theory permissible under Rule 404(b),
the analysis is not at an end. The judge must now identify all the preliminary
or foundational facts conditioning the admissibility of the uncharged miscon-
duct under that theory.137 If the theory of logical relevance is the use of evi-
dence of defendant's plan to help identify defendant as the perpetrator, the
prosecutor must establish the preliminary fact of the existence of a true plan
in the defendant's mind. Alternatively, the theory may be that some aspect of
the charged crime cries out for explanation and that as part of the res gestae,
the uncharged act supplies the explanation. On this theory, the prosecutor
must shoulder the burden of specifying the aspect requiring explanation and
demonstrating that the uncharged misconduct furnishes a noncharacter
explanation.
Finally, the judge must determine whether the prosecutor has presented
sufficient evidence of the existence of all the foundational elements and prelim-
inary facts. In most cases, the existence of such facts will condition the logical
relevance of the evidence and the conditional relevancy procedure, codified in
Federal Rule 104(b), will govern.' 38 The prosecutor will have to present suffi-
cient evidence to create a permissive inference that the fact exists."39 Without
this foundational proof, the judge should exclude the uncharged misconduct.
This foundational proof is necessary to ensure that the uncharged misconduct
possesses the independent relevance required to satisfy the common law char-
acter ban and Rule 404(b). Uncharged misconduct is always logically relevant
on the forbidden, character theory; it tends to show the defendant's propensity
for anti-social conduct. Unless the trial judge makes certain that the un-
charged misconduct in fact possesses the independent relevance claimed by the
prosecutor, the jurors will probably use the evidence for the forbidden purpose.
The trial judge cannot be bemused by talismans such as "plan" and "res ges-
tae." The judge must look beyond the labels invoked by the prosecutor and
insist on adequate proof of the preliminary facts guaranteeing the independent
relevance of the evidence.
There is an immediate, imperative need for more meticulous logical rele-
vance analysis of uncharged misconduct evidence. It bears repeating that all
137. See FED. R. EvID. 104.
138. FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
139. Rule 104(b) requires "evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfill-
ment of the condition." Id.
[Vol. 50
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/6
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
the empirical studies to date demonstrate that uncharged misconduct is one of
the most damning species of evidence.Y40 Moreover, uncharged misconduct evi-
dence is being offered more frequently than ever before. The widespread adop-
tion of Rule 404(b) has led to a general liberalization of the standards for
admitting the evidence,' 4' and the evidence is more readily available to prose-
cutors because a growing number of jurisdictions maintain computerized data
on recidivist criminals . 41 Yet, to a greater degree than in any other area of
criminal evidence, the courts have lost sight of the fundamental principles of
logical relevance in administering the uncharged misconduct doctrine.143 The
most basic rules of logical relevance have been almost forgotten and relegated
far into the background. 44
The reform must start somewhere. For several reasons, a reappraisal of
the plan theory would be an ideal starting place for reforming the application
of the uncharged misconduct doctrine. The plan theory is one of the most
frequently used rationales for admitting uncharged misconduct. Like the doc-
trine itself, the plan theory has been misapplied because of the courts' neglect
of the most elementary rules of logical relevance. Even more importantly, the
courts' misapplication of the plan theory epitomizes the errors that on a larger
scale have distorted the courts' application of the doctrine. The flaws of the
plan theory are a microcosm of the flaws of the doctrine. It would be only
fitting if the theory that once epitomized the doctrine's flaws became the para-
digm for the doctrine.
140. Empirical studies have been conducted by the London School of Economics,
see 7 J.L. REF. 535, 544-45 (1974); L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evi-
dence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208; Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balanc-
ing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961), the Chicago Jury Project, see 1 H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 179 (1966), and the National Science
Foundation Law and Social Science Program. See Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere &
Johnson, Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Im-
pact of Improper Evidence on Juries, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147, 1162.
141. The House Committee on the Judiciary stated that it intended Rule 404(b)
to place "greater emphasis on [the] admissibility . . . " of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 4 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7081 (1974); United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978).
142. Hall, The Trial of a Recidivist and Proof of Other Crimes, CASE & COM-
MENT, Sep.-Oct. 1979, at 46.
143. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevance-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L.
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